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ABSTRACT: Coherence is a measure of how much our beliefs hang together. Understanding is achieved when we see 
that something is not just a brute, isolated fact. This suggests that it might be possible to use the extant proba-
bilistic measures of coherence to formulate a measure of understanding. We attempt to do so, but it turns out 
that a coherence theory runs into trouble with the asymmetry of understanding. We identify four difficulties 
and show how they have been solved by a unification approach to explanation. We also identify four advan-
tages of the coherence approach, and assess the possibilities of reconciling the strengths of the two approaches.
Keywords: coherence, understanding, explanation, unification, asymmetry
RESUMEN: La coherencia es una medida sobre cuánta interdependencia hay entre nuestras creencias. La comprensión 
se obtiene cuando vemos que algo no es un hecho bruto, aislado. Esto sugiere la posibilidad de usar las medidas 
probabilísticas de coherencia al uso para elaborar una medida de la comprensión. Exploraré esta posibilidad, a 
pesar de que una teoría de la coherencia tropieza con problemas aquí dado el carácter asimétrico de la compren-
sión. Identifico cuatro dificultades al respecto y muestro cómo han sido resueltas mediante un enfoque de la ex-
plicación basado en la noción de unificación. También identifico cuatro ventajas en la aproximación desde la 
coherencia y examino qué perspectivas hay de reconciliar los puntos fuertes de ambos planteamientos. 
Palabras clave: coherencia, comprensión, explicación, unificación, simetría
1. Introduction
Philosophers have used the concept of coherence to analyse several of the central notions of 
epistemology: truth (e.g., Blanshard 1937), knowledge (e.g., Davidson 1986), and especially 
justification (e.g., BonJour 1985). Not all of these attempts have been equally successful, 
but the concept of coherence remains central to contemporary epistemology. Starting with 
Shogenji (1999), there has been a lively debate about ways in which coherence can be given 
a formal probabilistic definition, with important contributions being Olsson (2002), Fitel-
son (2003), Bovens & Hartmann (2003) and Douven & Meijs (2007).
Meanwhile, philosophers of science have become more interested in the notion of un-
derstanding (see De Regt, Leonelli & Eigner 2009 and De Regt 2013 for good overviews). 
Understanding is supposed to be the result of successful explanation, but it may also be 
available from other sources, such as visual models (Lipton 2009) or unification (Gijsbers 
2013). No real attempt at formalisation has been made, although Schurz (1999) and Gijs-
bers (2014) suggest that Schurz and Lambert’s (1994) formal measure of unification might 
capture at least part of it.
Several authors have suggested that coherence and understanding are closely related 
(e.g., Kvanvig 2003, Riggs 2003, Elgin 2012). These proposals, however, have not taken full 
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advantage of the formal developments in the field, and have remained relatively vague. The 
aim of the current paper is to explore whether the formal probabilistic coherence of a sub-
ject’s beliefs can be used as a measure of her understanding of specific phenomena being the 
case.1 Ideally, such a coherence theory of understanding would take the form of a formula 
like this:
US(p) = […]
where US(p) is subject S’s understanding of phenomenon p, and the right side of the equa-
tion applies a formal measure of coherence to S’s body of beliefs in general and p’s place in 
it in particular.
We will not succeed in finding such a formula in this paper. Instead, we will be using 
several simple coherence theories of understanding to assess how promising such theories 
actually are. Of special interest to us will be the problem of asymmetry – well-known from 
the literature on explanation, and reappearing, although in slightly different form, in our 
intuitions about understanding – and the demands that a solution to that problem leads 
to. We identify four difficulties and show how they have already been solved by Schurz 
and Lambert’s unificationist approach to explanation. On the other hand, we also identify 
four advantages of the coherence approach. We then assess the prospects for unifying the 
strengths of the two theories, and conclude that the most promising suggestion is that both 
capture a part of our idea of understanding.
We start, in section 2, by exploring several reasons for thinking that coherence and un-
derstanding must be closely linked. We also clarify the context of the current investigation 
by pointing out some of the issues and theories that we will ignore. In section 3 we intro-
duce two of the formal measures of coherence and two possible ways of linking these meas-
ures to understanding. In section 4, we introduce the problem of asymmetry, and show that 
our measures cannot handle it. In section 5, we discuss whether our formal theories of co-
herence can be improved. Four problems and potential solutions are identified. In section 
6, we compare Schurz and Lambert’s unificationist theory of explanation with our coher-
ence approach and argue that both have advantages which would be hard to replicate in the 
framework of the other. In section 7, we conclude that a pluralistic approach is the most 
promising.
2. Coherence and understanding: love at first sight?
There are several reasons for believing that coherence and understanding are closely related. 
True, coherence is a property of sets of propositions, while understanding is something that 
applies to individual elements of such a set. And coherence is often —though not invaria-
bly— supposed to be an objective property of a set of propositions, while understanding is 
1 My focus, then, will be on what has been called explanatory understanding rather than objectual under-
standing; see Kvanvig 2009 and Khalifa 2013. However, as has just been indicated, it is certainly open 
to doubt whether explanatory understanding must result from explanations, which makes this termi-
nology less than ideal.
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something that cannot exist without a subject. But these differences also exist between co-
herence and justification, and are easily circumvented – after all, our claim is not that the 
two concepts are identical. Thus, one possible way to spell out the (hypothetical) relation 
between understanding and coherence is this:
A subject S with a set of beliefs SB understands the fact that p if and only if p is in SB, and SB 
is more coherent than SB – p.
Here the idea is that a subject understands p just in case she believes p, and p coheres with 
her other beliefs in the sense that removing p makes her total set of beliefs less coherent. 
We will call this way of spelling out the relation between coherence and understanding 
the “addition option”, since it looks at what happens to the coherence of a set of beliefs 
when p is added to it. An example: I believe that studying philosophy will make you wise; 
that Friedrich has studied philosophy; and that Friedrich is wise. Given these three beliefs, 
I surely understand why Friedrich is wise. And indeed, a reasonable notion of coherence 
will imply that this set of three statements is more coherent than the set containing only 
the first two.
There are other possibilities for spelling out the relation. For instance, one could com-
pare the coherence of the subject’s current beliefs with that of her beliefs if she were to stop 
believing p and start believing not-p instead. We will call this way of spelling out the rela-
tion between coherence and understanding the “alternatives option”. Instead of merely 
dropping the belief that Friedrich is wise, I replace it with the belief that he is unwise. That 
would presumably give me a less coherent set; and so we again reach the conclusion that I 
understand why Friedrich is wise.
These examples give us a (still weak) reason to believe that a coherence theory of un-
derstanding is possible. But there are also deeper reasons. Consider what Douven and Meijs 
(2007) claim to be “our most basic intuitions” about coherence: “that coherence is a matter 
of hanging or fitting together, and that coherence is a matter of degree” (p. 405). Shogenji 
(1999) agrees (p. 338).
These are also two of our most basic intuitions about understanding. That there are de-
grees of understanding is uncontroversial. A folk theory about drunkenness gives me some 
understanding of why people can’t drive straight after drinking six beers, but I can deepen 
that understanding by learning more about the chemical composition of beer and the neu-
rological effects of ethanol.
Even more central is the intuition that understanding is a matter of hanging to-
gether. Kosso (2002) dramatised this intuition by coming up with figure of the Omnis-
cienter, a being who knows every particular fact about the universe, but is unable to see 
any connections between them. Kosso claims, and we can surely agree with him, that the 
Omniscienter understands nothing. To understand something is to grasp certain connec-
tions; for instance, between an event and its causes, or between an event and the law of 
nature which it instantiates. To understand something is to see that it is not just a brute 
fact.
Since coherence is supposed to be a non-binary measure of how well beliefs hang to-
gether, and understanding is a non-binary state that a subject is in only when she grasps cer-
tain connections between her beliefs, the idea of a coherence theory of understanding looks 
very natural. More natural, perhaps, than the idea of a coherence theory of justification. 
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For at least at first sight, it seems to be possible for S to be justified in believing p even if 
there are no links between p and any other beliefs of the subject. Aren’t there, the argument 
would run, propositions that are known non-inferentially, perhaps through sense percep-
tion? Isn’t it the case that no other beliefs have to play a role in that process? And doesn’t 
that mean that coherence – even if it can perhaps play a role in some situations – could not 
possibly be constitutive of justification?
This chain of reasoning can be resisted, of course (the locus classicus is perhaps Sell-
ars 1956, though the argument can be traced back much further). But in the case of under-
standing, this problem does not even arise, because it is obvious that understanding p will 
always involve other beliefs. Non-inferential understanding, if it exists, creates no trouble 
for a coherence theory, because non-inferential understanding would still be a grasping of 
certain kinds of relations between beliefs. So the idea that understanding must be closely 
linked to coherence comes up naturally.
The idea that coherence and understanding are related is not new. Elgin (2012) speaks 
of the suggestion “that coherence is the hallmark of understanding” (though she does not 
endorse the suggestion without qualifications). Kvanvig (2003) suggests that a subject has 
understanding when she possesses “a body of information together with the grasping of ex-
planatory connections concerning that body of information”. Riggs (2003) claims that “the 
epistemological notion of ‘coherence’ and the idea of ‘explanatory coherence’ in particular 
seem to be getting very close to something characteristic of understanding.” 
To a certain extent, such claims are unproblematic. Understanding involves connec-
tions between beliefs, and therefore something like coherence. But it is one thing to en-
dorse this broad claim, and something else to say that understanding must be analysed 
in terms of coherence, or that measures of coherence are the tools we need to construct a 
measure of understanding. It is this more precise and less obvious claim that we will investi-
gate in the rest of the paper using several formal measures of coherence.
Some remarks about the limitations of this investigation need to be made in advance. 
Since our concern is solely to establish whether there is a relation between understanding 
and formal measures of coherence, we will bracket several of the questions that have been 
raised in the context of coherence theories of understanding. First, we will bracket the 
question of whether and how a coherent set of beliefs must be tethered to the actual facts; 
for instance, by being true, or by having been caused by the facts. (See Elgin 2012 for a dis-
cussion of tethering. In ignoring this question, we will also ignore the issue of whether a 
theory of understanding needs to satisfy anti-Gettier conditions, something that Kvan-
vig 2003 denies and DePaul & Grimm 2007 affirm.) Second, we will bracket the ques-
tion of whether and in what sense the subject must not only have a set of coherent beliefs, 
but must also grasp that coherence (Elgin 2007). Third, we will bracket the question of 
whether the subject must be able to use the claims she understands, e.g., whether she has 
to be able to see some of the consequences of those claims. (Such use plays a crucial role in 
the well-known theory of understanding developed by Dieks & de Regt 2005.) We will 
simply assume that in all our examples, any requirements for understanding of these types, 
whatever they may turn out to be, are satisfied – that the beliefs we mention are true, 
grasped, usable, and so on.
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3. Introducing formal coherence theories
Recent attempts to formalise coherence have used a probabilistic framework: the co-
herence of a set of propositions is defined in terms of the probabilities of those prop-
ositions or their logical combinations. Let us look at two examples. Take the set A of 
propositions <A1, A2, …, An>. Shogenji (1999) then defines the coherence of that set 
as:
C A( )= P A1∧A2∧...∧An( )P A1( )×P A2( )× ...×P An( )
that is, the joint probability of the propositions divided by their multiplied individual prob-
abilities. Olsson (2002) proposes an alternative measure:
C A( )= P A1∧A2∧...∧An( )P A1∨A2∨...∨An( )
that is, the joint probability of the propositions divided by the probability of their disjunc-
tion. Both measures aim to capture the intuitive idea that a set of propositions is coherent 
when the propositions in the set probabilistically strengthen each other.
The literature contains several other probabilistic measures of coherence, see e.g. Fit-
elson (2003) and Bovens & Hartmann (2003), and, for an overview and discussion, Dou-
ven & Meijs (2007). We will focus on the measures of Shogenji and Olsson partly for rea-
sons of simplicity, and partly because we will only use them as diagnostic tools for finding 
the difficulties for coherence theories of understanding. Using other measures would not, 
we believe, substantially alter the discussion.
In order to see how these measures work out in practice, let us look at the following set 
of statements:
A1 = Studying philosophy will make you wise.
A2 = Friedrich has studied philosophy.
A3 = Friedrich is wise.
Suppose that A1 is certain; that P(A2) = 0.02; and that P(A3) = 0.1. Since in this case all 
philosophers are wise, the joint probability of these three statements is equal to the prob-
ability of A2, 0.02.
According to Shogenji’s measure, the set containing all three propositions has a coher-
ence of 0.02 / (0.1 * 0.02) = 10. This is quite a big bigger than 1, which is the neutral point 
on Shogenji’s scale, and therefore indicates large coherence. According to Olsson’s meas-
ure, the coherence of the set is 0.02 / 1 = 0.02. This number lies on a scale between 0 (com-
pletely incoherent) and 1 (completely coherent); presumably, the right interpretation of 
0.02 is “quite incoherent”.
We see that these two measures of coherence can yield rather different results when 
asked to assess the overall coherence of a set of propositions. This can be seen espe-
cially clearly when we take a set containing just one proposition. Both formulas yield the 
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number 1, but for Olsson this indicates maximal coherence, while for Shogenji it indicates 
the balance point between coherence and incoherence.
However, for our purposes we are not interested in the total coherence of a set. The 
idea we wish to investigate is that we understand why p just in case that adding p to the rest 
of our knowledge increases its coherence (the addition option); or perhaps just in case that 
adding p to the rest of our knowledge leads to a more coherent set than adding not-p (the 
alternatives option).
In our example, we presumably understand A3, that Friedrich is wise. Let us see how 
the two options and the two measures of coherence fare.
Shogenji Olsson
C(A1, A2) 0.02/0.02 = 1 0.02/1 = 0.02
C(A1, A2, A3) 0.02/0.002 = 10 0.02/1 = 0.02
C(A1, A2, not-A3) 0/0.018 = 0 0/1 = 0
Using the Shogenji measure, both the addition option (10 > 1) and the alternatives option 
(10 > 0) give the correct assessment that we understand A3. Using the Olsson option, only 
the alternatives option (0.02 > 0) gives the correct assessment, while the addition option 
suggests that there is no understanding (0.02 = 0.02).
It may be objected that the epistemic situation we have sketched is unrealistic, 
since we assumed that the hypothesis that studying philosophy makes you wise is abso-
lutely certain. The limit cases with probabilities 0 and 1 sometimes lead to unwanted 
but unimportant results in probabilistic epistemology. So let us redo the calculation 
with these new assumptions: P(A1) = 0.9; if P(A1) is false, it is instead the case that 
philosophy and wisdom are unrelated, and thus A2 and A3 are probabilistically inde-
pendent. We also assume that A1 is probabilistically independent of A2. The new table 
then looks like this:
Shogenji Olsson
C(A1, A2) 0.018/0.018 = 1 0.018/0.902 ≈ 0.01996
C(A1, A2, A3) 0.018/0.0018 = 10 0.018/0.9118 ≈ 0.01974
C(A1, A2, not-A3) 0/0.0162 = 0 0/0.9902 = 0
We see that the verdicts remain the same, with Olsson’s measure combined with the addi-
tion option now even giving a negative rating to our understanding of A3. (From now on, 
I will continue using the P(A1) = 1 version of the example, because that makes the calcula-
tions much easier to follow.)
This means that the Shogenji-addition test, the Shogenji-alternatives test, and the Ols-
son-alternatives test are on the table as potentially correct tests for assessing understanding. 
Each of them allows us to set up a formula for the amount of understanding that a certain 
subject S has. For the addition option, we would have
US(p) = F(C(BS, p), C(BS))
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with US(p) the amount of understanding that S has of P, with C the chosen measure of co-
herence, and with F some function that adequately picks out the difference in coherence. 
(F might just be subtraction, but whether that is appropriate will depend on the exact na-
ture of C.) The alternatives option would lead to a formula of the form
US(p) = F(C(BS, p), C(BS, not-p))
At this point, however, rather than develop these theories further, we need to investigate 
a general counterargument against the very possibility of probabilistic coherence being a 
measure of understanding.
4. An asymmetry problem
Any reader familiar with the literature on explanation may wonder whether a coherence 
theory of understanding based on a probabilistic notion of coherence can handle the coun-
terarguments that were used to undermine the DN-model of explanation. Specifically, we 
may wonder whether a coherence theory can adequately capture the asymmetry of under-
standing, which it inherits – at least to a certain extent – from the asymmetry of explana-
tion. We will first look at how this counterargument might go in general; then we will look 
at a more realistic example where the measures of understanding developed in the previous 
section indeed deliver the wrong answer; and finally, we consider several responses to the 
problem.
The general argument goes like this. A purely probabilistic measure of coherence de-
fines coherence in terms of the probabilities of propositions and logical combinations of 
those propositions. But we can show that two propositions can stand in the exact same 
probabilistic relations to the other propositions in a set, while having a very different status 
in terms of our understanding of them.
Consider the following three propositions:
B1 = For all x, F(x) → G(x).
B2 = F(a).
B3 = G(a).
Let P(B1) be 1. Then F(a) → G(a), and B2 and B3 are probabilistically indistinguishable. But 
they might nevertheless be distinguishable in terms of understanding, for instance when B1 
is an explanatory law stating that property G is caused by property F. For example, F could 
be the property “is a moving charged object”, and G the property “would be deflected when 
moving through a magnetic field”. When we know that a certain object is moving and 
charged, we presumably understand why it would be deflected by magnetic fields. (If one 
feels that B1 alone is too small a basis for understanding, one can add the laws of Maxwell 
and other central elements of electrodynamics to the set without ruining the example.) But 
when we know that the object would be deflected by magnetic fields, we of course know 
that it is moving and charged, but we do not yet understand why this is the case – or at least, 
we do not understand much of it. For that, we would presumably need to hear something 
about the history of the object.
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Any purely probabilistic measure of coherence, when converted into a test of under-
standing, must make the same pronouncement about B2 as about B3. But we understand B3 
and do not understand B2, so one of these pronouncements has to be wrong. Hence, proba-
bilistic measures of coherence cannot function as measures of understanding.
Is this asymmetry problem the result of what might perhaps be a highly unrealistic as-
sumption, namely, that there can be different properties that are perfectly correlated, and 
that the probability of this correlation holding can be 1? In order to show that we are not 
led astray by unrealistic assumptions, and to get a better sense of where and how our meas-
ures of coherence go wrong, let us look at how the measures developed in the previous sec-
tion fare in a more realistic example.
We return to Friedrich the philosopher. Presumably, we understand why Friedrich is 
wise, but we do not yet understand why Friedrich studied philosophy or why philosophy 
makes people wise – or, if we do, only to a truly minuscule extent. Do any of our tests lead 
to the right results here? Let us look at the coherence effects of adding A2. (Because both 
measures ignore the order of the set’s elements, the second line of the table will not change 
from the table in the previous section. Note that the prior probability of someone being a 
wise non-philosopher is 0.08.)
Shogenji Olsson
C(A1, A3) 0.1/0.1 = 1 0.1/1 = 0.1
C(A1, A3, A2) 0.02/0.002 = 10 0.02/1 = 0.02
C(A1, A3, not-A2) 0.08/0.098 ≈ 0.82 0.08/1 = 0.08
Using Shogenji’s measure, both the addition option and the alternatives option falsely 
claim that we understand A2 to a significant extent. Using Olsson’s measure, both options 
correctly state that we do not.
But if we think through how Olsson’s measure works, that success is not very reassuring. 
Take the addition option first. It will always result in the verdict that there is no understand-
ing. For given two sets A and B such that A is a subset of B, Olsson’s measure will never give 
higher coherence to B than to A. One can easily see this by looking at the formula: if we add 
more propositions to the set of Ais, the numerator can only remain the same or go down, 
while the denominator can only remain the same or go up. This means that the combination 
of the addition option and Olsson’s measure will get all example where there is no under-
standing right, but it will also get all examples where there is understanding wrong.
In the case of the alternatives option, Olsson’s measure leads to the right conclusion 
only because P(not-A2 & A3) > P(A2); that is, because in our example there are more wise 
non-philosophers than philosophers. Suppose that wisdom goes in decline, and now only 
3% of the entire populace is wise, while the population of philosophers, all of whom are 
wise, remains 2%. Our new values are:
Olsson
C(A1, A3) 0.03/1 = 0.03
C(A1, A3, A2) 0.02/1 = 0.02
C(A1, A3, not-A2) 0.01/1 = 0.01
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Now the alternatives option claims that we do understand why Friedrich is a philosopher. 
Furthermore, we can change the number in the final columns as we wish by choosing dif-
ferent percentages of non-philosophers who are wise, even though that percentage has 
nothing to do with our understanding of A2, the claim that Friedrich is a philosopher. So 
it seems that the Olsson-alternatives option doesn’t give us a defensible measure of under-
standing either. None of the four options we have surveyed, then, yields the right answers 
even in this simple and realistic case of asymmetry.
There are several ways to respond to the general argument, and a forteriori to the spe-
cial case described above. One is of course to abandon the project we have engaged in en-
tirely, but that would be admitting defeat too quickly. Let us instead look at a response that 
attempts to undercut the argument itself. That explanation is asymmetric is generally ac-
cepted (Van Fraassen 1980 is one of the rare exceptions, and his tower argument has not 
received much support). But, we may wonder, is the same true of understanding? Can it 
not be the case that while A helps me understand B, B also helps me understand A?
Now, it seems that this response is correct to the extent that it is much harder to argue 
for the radical asymmetry of understanding than it is to argue for the radical asymmetry of 
explanation. Especially on a causal theory of explanation, one can claim that, since there is 
no backwards causation, if A is part of an explanation of B, B cannot be part of an explana-
tion of A. The argument would be non-trivial, but might be defensible. However, if under-
standing can be gained by means other than explanation, it is not easy to see why we would 
believe that A and B can never give understanding of each other; and so there is no radical 
asymmetry of this kind.
But of course, the counterargument given above does not depend on the claim that 
understanding is radically asymmetrical. It merely depends on the claim that it is possible 
for two probabilistically indistinguishable propositions to be understood to a different ex-
tent. Perhaps we have some understanding of B2 due to its coherence with B1 and B3. But it 
seems evident that this understanding is much less than our understanding of B3. And that 
is all we need for our counterexample to work: there is an asymmetry in understanding that 
our coherence measures cannot capture.
Another way to respond to the problem is to suggest that we might need to search for 
measures that are more appropriate for capturing the asymmetry of understanding; perhaps we 
can avoid trouble and still stay close to our original ideas. This is what we will do later in the pa-
per. But for now, we want to push the probabilistic coherence measures as far as possible.
Yet another way to respond is to note that the counterargument merely shows that our 
coherence measures cannot function as measures of understanding on their own. But this 
leaves open the possibility that we could add some other tests to them which can weed out 
or adjust for unwanted results. We noted in our preliminary discussion that understand-
ing always involves hanging together, and that coherence measures how much propositions 
hang together. But our discussion of asymmetry suggests that understanding is more than 
hanging together, since hanging together would seem to be a prototypically symmetric re-
lation. So perhaps coherence is a necessary ingredient of understanding, but not a sufficient 
one. Something else is needed, something that generates the asymmetries of understanding. 
In the next section, we will construct a ‘wish list’ of things that need to be added to our co-
herence measures to turn them into a satisfactory theory of understanding. Afterwards, we 
will pose the question whether such a theory is feasible, and whether it could still be called 
a coherence theory of understanding.
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5. Making coherence asymmetric: four demands
In this section, we will argue that a coherence theory of understanding needs to be changed 
in four ways if it is to deal satisfactorily with the asymmetry of understanding:
1. One must ensure that understanding cannot be gained from cohering with state-
ments lower in the hierarchy of understanding (a term to be explained shortly). 
For this one needs to have a way to distinguish the levels of this hierarchy.
2. One must ensure that understanding cannot be gained from duplications of con-
tent; some way of analysing propositions into their component parts and removing 
any duplicates is necessary for this.
3. One must find a way to ensure that understanding depends on the presence and 
the content of connecting principles.
4. One must find a way to respect the asymmetry of causal principles.
We will start by developing the idea of a hierarchy of understanding. Let us call those fea-
tures of the world that primarily call out for explanation the phenomena; we can remain ag-
nostic about their precise nature, but some philosophers will want to identify them with 
our perceptions while others may choose to identify them with singular facts that are rela-
tively close to perceptual verification.
Now understanding consists in the grasping of certain kinds of connections. But, at 
least at first glance, phenomena as singular facts have only two kinds of connections to each 
other, neither of which is enough for understanding. First, there are spatio-temporal rela-
tions. But merely pointing out spatio-temporal relations does not make us understand phe-
nomena (though these relations may play an important role when connected to theories 
that involve spatio-temporal relations). Second, there are the purely logical relations that 
obtain between aggregate and component phenomena. For instance, the phenomenon that 
John is a male human is an aggregate phenomenon that logically implies the component 
phenomenon that John is a human. But the purely logical relations between aggregates and 
components do not give an understanding of the components; or, if they do, only a very 
meagre understanding at best.
Phenomena, then, lack the connections to each other that are necessary for under-
standing. These connections have to be added, and this is precisely the task of theories; or 
rather, of that which theories express, which we can call connecting principles. Many things 
can play the role of connecting principles. Some candidates are causal laws, other laws of 
nature, principles of reduction, metaphysical principles, natural classifications, and the 
transcendental laws of human cognition. In this paper, we will be neutral with regard to 
the plausibility of any of these candidates.
However, as is well known from the discussion of the difference between lawlike and 
accidental patterns, not every general statement can give us (significant) understanding of 
the particular phenomena that it implies.2 The accidental truth that “everyone in this room 
2 It is possible that in cases like these —and some of the other cases below— a small amount of under-
standing is given. The asymmetry we are interested in in this section need not be the asymmetry be-
tween full and no understanding, but can be an asymmetry between much and little understanding. 
Since our coherence theory of understanding admits of degrees, and therefore must get degrees of un-
derstanding right, such cases are relevant.
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has a beard” added to the particular fact that Victor is in the room doesn’t give us much, if 
any, understanding of why Victor has a beard.
In general, the direction of understanding seems to be a hierarchy like this:
connecting principles → phenomena → accidental patterns.
Connecting principles like causal laws make us understand phenomena. They generally do 
not do this by themselves, but with the help of other phenomena; the connecting principles 
form the background, as it were, against which one phenomenon (Friedrich’s being a phi-
losopher) can increase our understanding of another phenomenon (Friedrich’s being wise). 
For them to play this role, it is essential that we see the principles as expressive of real con-
nections and not just as accidental patterns. If we had any reason to suspect that the corre-
lation between being a philosopher and being wise was spurious, just an accident, much of 
our understanding of Friedrich’s wisdom would evaporate.
Accidental patterns, in turn, can be understood by being derived from particular phe-
nomena. We understand why everyone in this room has a beard when we understand that 
it is an accidental truth that follows from the particular facts that only Victor, John and 
Hassan are in the room, and that Victor, John and Hassan all have beards. (In general, it 
seems intuitively true that if we understand some body of beliefs, we then also understand 
all of its logical consequences.)
A good theory of understanding should be able to correctly tell us that connecting 
principles give far greater understanding of the phenomena than accidental patterns do; 
and it might have to do this by explicitly incorporating a the idea of a hierarchy of under-
standing. This would solve at least some cases of asymmetry. (This is demand #1 from the 
list above.)
What we can try to do, then, is take a test like the Shogenji-addition or the Olsson-
alternatives test, and add the following stipulation: p is understood if and only if the test 
is passed and this passing of the test is at least partly due to p’s relations with propositions 
higher up in the hierarchy of understanding. (For ease of expression, we will ignore the dif-
ference between propositions and the principles, patterns and phenomena that make them 
true.) So if p is an accidental pattern, and it coheres because of the presence of phenomena, 
p is understood. But if p is a connecting principle, and it coheres because of the presence of 
phenomena, it is not understood, because phenomena are lower in the hierarchy of under-
standing.
A problem confronts us immediately. Coherence is a global property of sets of proposi-
tions. Given any new proposition p, we can check whether adding it to a set S increases or 
decreases the coherence of that set. But how can we see what parts of S are responsible for 
the increase or decrease? Does it even make sense to ask such a question? Isn’t it the set as a 
whole that is responsible?
To make this worry more concrete, let us consider the set C which consists of the fol-
lowing five propositions:




C5 = F(a) & G(b)
64 Victor Gijsbers
Theoria 30/1 (2015): 53-71
Here C1 is a connecting principle which implies that all Fs are Gs, while C5 is an ac-
cidental pattern that does not explain either of its conjuncts. Let us assume that the prob-
ability of anything being an F is 50%; the probability of anything being a G is 50%; that the 
probability of C1 is 50%; and that if C1 is false, being F and being G are probabilistically un-
related. (It follows from these probabilities that if C1 is true, anything that is G has a 100% 
chance to also be F.)
Using this background set of beliefs, we want to consider whether we understand
D = G(b).
We presumably do, and indeed, using the Shogenji measure we find:
Shogenji
C(C) 0.125 / (0.5*0.5*0.5*0.5*0.25) = 8
C(C + D) 0.125 / (0.5*0.5*0.5*0.5*0.25*0.5) = 16
C(C + not-D) 0 / (0.5*0.5*0.5*0.5*0.25*0.5) = 0
so according to both the Shogenji-addition and the Shogenji-alternatives test, we under-
stand D. (We will ignore the Olsson measure for now, since for the current discussion the 
difference between the two measures is unimportant and the calculations are already com-
plicated enough.) We now want to apply our new extra criterion, so we must determine 
which part of C is responsible for the increase in coherence when we add D. One way to do 
that is to see whether the coherence still increases if we ignore one of the propositions in C. 
This should be a rough, if imperfect, guide to which propositions in C are responsible for 
the coherence.
But when we try to apply this procedure, we run into a question that we have not had 
to answer until now, namely, the question of what happens to conditional probabilities 




Does it cohere? One way to think about it is that, no, it does not. We just have two partic-
ular facts, and they are not connected in any way. So we might want say that P(C3 & D) = 
P(C3) × P(D) = 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25; and then we would find that the set is indeed not coher-
ent.
However, that would be the wrong move to make, since removing C1 from our 
set of propositions doesn’t alter the objective probabilities underlying the situation. 
The value of P(C3 & D) doesn’t depend on whether C1 is or is not part of the set 
of propositions we are evaluating. Whether it is part of that set or not, P(C1) = 0.5, 
and P(C3 & D) = 0.5 × P(C3) + 0.5 × P(C3) × P(D) = 0.375. So the Shogenji coherence 
for the set {C3, D} is not 1, but 1.5. A set of just two seemingly unrelated observations can 
be coherent if there is an objective probability that the observations are probabilistically 
linked.
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For our purposes, this is a terrible result. It threatens to undermine the entire idea that 
we could use coherence to measure how well the principles in a certain set of propositions 
allow us to understand the phenomena in that set. For such a set could cohere even if none 
of the principles connect any of the phenomena. Worse, consider a situation in which a 
principle Y connecting F-ness to G-ness is probabilistically correlated with a different prin-
ciple X connecting H-ness to J-ness. (Perhaps both are part of the same overarching theory, 
and therefore likely to be true or false together.) Then X, C3 and D would cohere, even in 
the strong sense that removing any of the three, or replacing any of the three by its oppo-
site, will decrease coherence. And this seems to suggest that X gives us understanding of D, 
and indeed almost as much as Y. But it seems unlikely that X could give us more than a very 
tiny amount of understanding of C3 and D.
One might hope to escape from this result by interpreting the probabilities as subjec-
tive degrees of belief of a subject. But that won’t do either, because it is possible to assign 
subjective probabilities in such a way that the probabilistic structure of real understand-
ing is copied even though the actual beliefs do not objectively grant such understanding. 
That is, it is possible to have belief assignments that do not grant understanding but that 
are nevertheless probabilistically indistinguishable from belief assignments that do. For 
example, take any situation in which the set consisting of connecting principle X and 
phenomena Y and Z passes some coherence-understanding test for Z. Now replace X 
with an arbitrary connecting principle X’. As long as the subject assigns the same prob-
abilities to all statements involving X’ as it did to those involving X (and that might well 
be possible even without making herself vulnerable to Dutch books), the new set will 
also pass the coherence-understanding test. But that means that the test must be wrong, 
because it is false that any phenomenon can be understood using any connecting princi-
ple whatsoever.3
A coherence theory of understanding must make understanding depend on two things: 
(1) the fact that the propositions in question are actually believed by the subject, that is, 
that they are part of the set whose coherence we are measuring; and (2) the objective va-
lidity of the probabilistic connections that obtain between those propositions. (This is de-
mand #3 from the list above.) The objective interpretation of probability fails the first test, 
while the subjective interpretation fails the second.
I am not sure how to solve this problem, although we will see a suggestion in the next 
section. Let us assume that a solution can be found. Presumably, this solution will have the 
result that if we take set C and remove C1 from it, the probabilistic connection between 
C2 and C4 disappears, as does that between C3 and D. With this assumption, we can start 
anew our attempt to find out which part of C is responsible for the increase in coherence 
when we add D.
3 One reviewer pointed out to me that it would be possible to hold that such belief substitutions are im-
possible, since the content of a belief is defined by its inferential relations to other beliefs. Hence, no 
two beliefs can have the same conditional probabilities assigned to them and still be other beliefs. I 
agree with this, but it seems to me that to avoid all examples of the kind I exploit here, one would have 
to assume an epistemically perfect subject. After all, the content of a belief is, on inferentialist theories, 
defined by the normatively correct inferential relations they have; but a normal subject can, of course, 
be mistaken about these. If misassignments of conditional probabilities are possible, then the kind of 
case I am exploiting would seem to be possible as well.
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Let C-i be the set C without the statement Ci. Then, omitting calculations, we find the 
following table for the Shogenji coherence:
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5
C(C-i) 2 4 4 4 2
C(C-i + D) 4 8 8 8 4
C(C-i + not-D) 0 0 0 0 0
What does this mean? If we take away any element of C, adding D still increases the coher-
ence using both the addition and the alternatives tests. So we could argue that no statement 
in C is responsible for D’s coherence with C. On the other hand, the coherence of C-i + D 
is smaller than that of C + D for all i; so we could also argue that all statements in C are re-
sponsible for D’s coherence with C.
Perhaps we should look beyond single statements. If we take away both C1 and C5, the 
coherence increasing effects of adding D disappear completely. So perhaps we should ar-
gue that it is the combination of C1 and C5 that makes D cohere with C. But that is an un-
welcome result, since we do not understand D because of the combination of a connecting 
principle and an accidental generalisation. And what may be even worse, the coherence in-
creasing effects of adding D also disappear if we take away C3 and C5. But it really isn’t the 
case that we understand D because of the combination of C3 and C5. (We presumably un-
derstand D because of the combination of C1 and C3.)
Is there a way out of these conundrums? Given that we are interested in whether or not 
we understand a certain phenomenon, we might perhaps be best off disregarding acciden-
tal patterns completely. After all, any coherence between the phenomenon and these pat-
terns will be irrelevant to our understanding of the phenomenon – though it might be rel-
evant to our understanding of the patterns. Since we are working from the assumption that 
on any level in the hierarchy of understanding lower-level statements are irrelevant, we can 
turn this into a general demand:
When testing whether a proposition p increases the coherence of a set A, one first has to re-
move from A all propositions that are lower in the hierarchy of understanding than p.
Propositions on the same level must remain: it is generally only the combination of a con-
necting principle and some phenomena that allows us to understand another phenome-
non.
So we should assess D’s effects on coherence after we have purged all accidental pat-
terns from C. That comes down to choosing C-5 as the relevant set. If D coheres with C-5, 
as indeed it does, can we then conclude that this coherence is due to connecting principles? 
For it seems as if it could also be due to just D’s coherence with other phenomena.
That worry can’t come true if phenomena by themselves do not cohere. And we sug-
gested earlier in this paragraph that this is indeed the case: connecting principles are needed 
to connect up phenomena and allow us to understand them. So if a set of phenomena and 
connecting principles coheres with a new statement describing a phenomenon, that must 
be due to the connecting principles linking the new phenomenon to some of the other phe-
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nomena. Which is exactly what we need in order to show that this asymmetry of under-
standing is satisfied.
However, we do need to worry whether our current conception of a coherence theory 
of understanding actually has this desirable feature. We pointed out that there can be ag-
gregate and component phenomena; e.g., John being a male human is an aggregate phe-
nomenon that has as components John being male and John being human. Having state-
ments describing all these phenomena in our set of propositions will generate coherence 
that doesn’t have anything to do with different phenomena being linked up by connecting 
principles. So before we assess the coherence effect of adding a new proposition, we should 
eliminate these sources of spurious coherence by analysing all propositions into their small-
est components, and removing any that are duplicated. We can turn this into a general de-
mand as well (this is demand #2 from the list above):
When testing whether a proposition p increases the coherence of a set A, one first has to ana-
lyse all propositions in A into their component parts, and remove all that are duplicated.
We will leave aside the difficult question of how to turn this demand into a precise formal 
recipe (though again we will see a suggestion in the next section).
Finally, we should note that nothing in our current conception of a coherence theory 
of understanding guarantees that we respect the asymmetries of causal explanation, such as 
the one we have seen in the case of Friedrich the philosopher. Given some general causal 
law linking F-ness to G-ness, we may well find that F(a) coheres with a set that contains 
G(a), and the other way around. But we believe that we gain more understanding of why 
events are the case by learning their causes, than we gain understanding of why events are 
the case by learning their effects. For causal principles and other asymmetric principles, we 
thus need some addition to our theory that compensates for any coherence in the wrong di-
rection. (This is demand #4 from the list above.) Again, we will leave aside the difficult task 
of making that demand precise, and simply state that a satisfactory coherence theory of un-
derstanding must somehow do so.
To summarise, we have seen in this section that a coherence theory of understanding, 
if it is to deal satisfactorily with the asymmetry of understanding,  must be changed in the 
four ways that we gave at the beginning of this section. To repeat:
1. One must ensure that understanding cannot be gained from cohering with state-
ments lower in the hierarchy of understanding. For this one needs to have a way to 
distinguish the levels of this hierarchy.
2. One must ensure that understanding cannot be gained from duplications of con-
tent; some way of analysing propositions into their component parts and removing 
any duplicates is necessary for this.
3. One must find a way to ensure that understanding depends on the presence of 
connecting principles and the objective validity of the probability assignments.
4. One must find a way to respect the asymmetry of causal principles.
This is a hefty list, and one may wonder not just how to implement it, but also whether the 
theory that would be left after implementing it would still be a coherence theory. This is 
not an idle question; for the literature contains a theory that is not a coherence theory, but 
precisely does fulfil these four requirements, namely Schurz and Lambert’s theory of uni-
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fication. So in the next section, we will compare coherence with unification, and ask our-
selves whether the idea of a coherence theory of understanding can be maintained in the 
face of the competition with unification.
6. Coherence and unification
Coherence theories of understanding face at least one competitor which already imple-
ments all of the four demands formulated in the previous section. Can they overcome this 
competition? We will first take a brief look at the competitor, Schurz and Lambert’s uni-
ficationist theory of explanation (Schurz & Lambert 1994, Schurz 1999; short summaries 
can be found in Schurz 2014, Gijsbers 2014). We will then set out the ways in which the 
coherence theories might nevertheless be superior, and give a brief indication of ways in 
which these strengths might be developed.
Like the measures of coherence we have investigated, Schurz and Lambert’s measure of 
unification is a global measure defined on the whole of a subject’s beliefs, although in the 
case of Schurz and Lambert this set is first appropriately sanitised. Before measuring unifica-
tion, Schurz and Lambert require us to transform the set of beliefs into the set of its relevant 
elements. This transformation is a complex logical procedure, but it comes down to analysing 
propositions into their component parts and removing any duplicates. The result is that all 
aggregate phenomena and accidental patterns are removed, thus fulfilling demand 2. 
Unlike the measures of coherence, which try to quantify what are potentially symmet-
ric relations of probabilistic dependence, the measure of unification is based on an asym-
metric relation of assimilation. The beliefs of the subject are divided into two sets, basic and 
assimilated beliefs, where a belief is assimilated just in case it can be derived from basic be-
liefs by arguments known to the subject. Applying the theory to understanding, we can say 
that the assimilated statements are understood, while the basic statements are not. State-
ments are assimilated just in case an argument known by the subject allows their derivation 
from basic statements. There is a normative component at work here: the arguments must 
be correct. So in order to unify her knowledge, a subject must have general beliefs that actu-
ally do imply – in a deductive or in a probabilistic sense – her specific beliefs about the phe-
nomena. This ensures that both the presence and the content of the subject’s beliefs are es-
sential, thus fulfilling demand 3.
The theory of Schurz and Lambert features a prominent distinction between data and 
hypotheses. Data are descriptions of what we have called phenomena, while hypotheses are 
all the other beliefs that survive the removal of irrelevant elements; these will all be con-
necting principles. Unification increases with the number of assimilated data, while de-
creasing with the number of basic hypotheses. (Basic data and assimilated hypotheses have 
no effect on unification.) This set-up allows the theory to fulfil demand 1.
Finally, any argument that is in accord with basic principles of causality gets a unifica-
tion bonus. Since there is also a demand to maximise unification, this leads to a situation 
in which effects are generally understood in terms of their causes, and not the other way 
around. This fulfils demand 4.
The fact that Schurz and Lambert’s theory of unification appears to have none of the 
weaknesses that the coherentist theories had, may appear to be a harsh blow against the 
prospect of using a formal measure of coherence to develop a measure of understanding. 
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But of course, this would only be the case if the coherence theories did not have strengths 
of their own. We believe we can identify four of these strengths.
First, the unification theory connects statements to each other using arguments. Co-
herence theories connect statements to each other through relations of probabilistic de-
pendence. Now arguments, in the sense used by Schurz and Lambert, imply probabilistic 
relationships; but probabilistic relationships perhaps do not imply arguments. If this is the 
case, coherence theories are broader. Specifically, if understanding without argumentation 
is possible, coherence allows us to capture that kind of understanding in a way that the the-
ory of Schurz and Lambert does not.
Second, coherence theories are better equipped to handle explanatory pluralism. For 
Schurz and Lambert, assimilation is not an all-or-nothing affair, since there are weaker and 
stronger types of argument that give rise to several grades of assimilation. But once a state-
ment is fully assimilated by a strong argument, no further unification can be gained from 
it. By contrast, any statement can always continue to grant further coherence to new state-
ments; it is never removed from further consideration. Thus, the unification theory seems 
to preclude explanatory pluralism. That is, it seems to preclude the idea that one and the 
same fact can be explained in radically different ways and that having all of these differ-
ent explanations at our disposal increases our understanding. For an assimilated fact is as-
similated, and adding more arguments of which it is the conclusion does not increase uni-
fication (though it may decrease it). But adding more connecting principles can increase 
coherence, even if a phenomenon is already strongly connected to other phenomena. If ex-
planatory pluralism is true, coherence theories would be in a better position to capture it.
Third, Schurz and Lambert’s theory states, presumably correctly, that we cannot ex-
plain the most fundamental of our hypotheses. But it is less clear that we do not understand 
these hypotheses. A coherence theory can make room for the plausible prospects of gaining 
some understanding of our most fundamental theories by seeing how they hang together 
with each other.
Finally, Schurz and Lambert offer only a vague and partial ordering of sets rather that a 
precise quantitative measure. In contrast, the coherence measures we have investigated are 
very precise, and assign a real number to every set of propositions. This increased precision 
is obviously a boon.
Given these competing sets of virtues, it is of course natural to wonder whether it 
would be possible to have the best of both worlds. For a coherence theory in particular, it 
would be ideal if the best elements of Schurz and Lambert could be lifted from their theory 
and incorporated into what remains fundamentally a coherentist measure. And perhaps 
this is possible for some parts of the theory. Although detailed and probably rather techni-
cal work remains to be done, it seems not unlikely that the distinction between phenomena 
and hypotheses could be used to remove as spurious all coherence that doesn’t increase co-
herence among the phenomena. There might also be a prospect for integrating the unifica-
tion bonus that Schurz and Lambert give to causation into a probabilistic measure of co-
herence by either developing a satisfactory probabilistic theory of causation (see Hitchcock 
2012 for an overview) or developing the Bayesian work on Inference to the Best Explana-
tion (e.g., Schupbach and Sprenger 2011) to extend to the asymmetry of explanation. 
But the main difference between the approach of Schurz and Lambert and that of coher-
ence theories is the difference between using an asymmetric relation of assimilation and using 
a potentially symmetric relation of probabilistic coherence. Since it is precisely the asymmetry 
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of their relation that allows Schurz and Lambert to avoid the most difficult problems of asym-
metry, one cannot simply replace their relation with one of the probabilistic measures of uni-
fication available in the literature (e.g., Myrvold 2003), which do not have this feature. And 
since a relation cannot be both asymmetric and not asymmetric, it is also hard to see how the 
relations could be ‘combined’. But more on combination in the next section.
7. Conclusions
Can formal coherence be a measure of understanding? Our investigations have not been 
entirely promising. At the very least, such a theory faces a set of difficult problems when 
confronted with the asymmetry of understanding. On the other hand, in comparing coher-
ence theories with Schurz and Lambert’s theory of unification, we have been able to iden-
tify not just the weaknesses, but also the strengths of a coherence approach.
We suggested in the previous paragraph that the prospects for a single theory that uni-
fies the strengths of both approaches may not be great – though it should be stressed that 
we have not given a strict impossibility proof. However, an easier way of achieving the goal 
of a satisfying measure of understanding may be available. Schurz (2014) argues that expla-
nation is a prototype concept: that is, a concept defined by a number of prototype properties 
that normally, but not invariably, go together. If that is true, the same will presumably hold 
for understanding. And that means that unification and coherence can perhaps be com-
bined into one single fuller picture of understanding; not as one theory, but as two theories, 
both of which capture a part of what we mean by understanding. Unification would allow 
us to understand the asymmetry of understanding, while coherence would help us do jus-
tice to explanatory pluralism and understanding that does not take the form of arguments.
If possible, such a reconciliation would be a happy end to this story. But working out 
the details of such a joint prototype theory, and thus showing that it is possible to com-
bine these two elements into a single quantitative measure of understanding, remains to be 
done. In the current article, we hope to have at least been able to give some of the frame-
work within which this work can take place.
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